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China’s arctic Strategy and Its Implications 
Shiloh rainwater
RaCE TO ThE NORTh
 the arctic, during the Cold War a locus of intense military competition be-tween the United states and the Union of soviet socialist republics, is rapidly 
reemerging as a geostrategic flash point. as accelerating climate change melts 
the arctic’s perennial sea ice, littoral as well as peripheral actors are preparing 
to exploit emergent economic and strategic opportunities in the High North. 
although the possibility of armed conflict over arctic resources has been some-
what discounted, a fair amount of saber rattling in recent years among the “arctic 
eight”—the United states, russia, Canada, denmark, finland, Iceland, Norway, 
and sweden—has given rise to the notion that circumpolar security actors may 
be priming for a “new kind of Cold War” in the North.1 russia, for example, 
has warned that countries could be at war within a decade over resources in the 
arctic region.2 
While a substantial body of literature has ad-
dressed the issue of arctic sovereignty disputes 
and the potential for conflict between the circum-
polar states, much less attention has been devoted 
to the “globalization” of these affairs. Non-arctic 
states, including China, India, and Italy, as well 
as the european Union collectively, are making 
preparations to exploit a seasonally ice-free arc-
tic, thus complicating the arctic’s already fragile 
security environment. as the finnish foreign min-
ister stated in 2009, “the arctic is evolving from a 
regional frozen backwater into a global hot issue.”3 
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Most notable among these external actors is the People’s republic of China 
(PrC), which has maintained a vast, well-funded arctic research apparatus since 
the mid-1990s and has invested heavily in arctic-resource projects in recent 
years. for China’s energy import–dependent economy, arctic resources and sea-
lanes present a welcome strategic remedy. In light of the nation’s growing arctic 
interests, Chinese leaders have begun to promulgate the notion that China is a 
“near-arctic state” and a “stakeholder” in arctic affairs.4 Notwithstanding China’s 
assertiveness with respect to its arctic interests, important questions remain as to 
how it will pursue these ambitions, as it possesses neither arctic territory nor the 
ability to vote on official policy at the arctic Council.5 Cognizant of these inher-
ent disadvantages, the PrC is leveraging its economic, political, and diplomatic 
might in order to secure for itself a say in arctic affairs.
this article analyzes the extent to which the PrC is pursuing foreign policies, 
whether “status quo” or “revisionist,” in the arctic, in an attempt to discern whether 
a “China threat” will materialize in the High North. While China’s overall position 
as a status quo or revisionist power is an issue beyond the scope of this article, 
analysis of China’s arctic strategy can be profitably couched in this terminology. 
traditionally, status quo states are considered those that have “participated in de-
signing the ‘rules of the game’ and stand to benefit from these rules,” while revision-
ist states are those that “express a ‘general dissatisfaction’ with their ‘position in the 
system’” and have a “desire to redraft the rules by which relations among nations 
work.”6 status quo states aim to maintain the balance of power “as it exists at a par-
ticular moment in history”;7 revisionist nations resort to military force to “change 
the status quo and to extend their values.”8
recent scholarship has expanded on this delineation, suggesting that rather 
than a dichotomy, the status quo/revisionist distinction is more usefully consid-
ered a complex spectrum that takes into account states that fall somewhere be-
tween its extremes. for example, in his pioneering 2003 study on China, alastair 
Iain Johnston proposed five levels of analysis by which to determine whether an 
actor is outside a status quo “international community.” Moving from the least 
to the most threatening with respect to the status quo, a non–status quo actor 
either minimally participates in the regulatory institutions of an international 
community; participates in these institutions yet breaks the rules and norms of 
the community; participates in these institutions and temporarily adheres to the 
community’s rules and norms yet attempts to “change these rules and norms in 
ways that defeat the original purposes of the institution and the community”; 
exhibits a preference for a “radical redistribution of material power in the inter-
national system”; or dedicates itself to realizing such a redistribution of power 
“and to this end military power is considered to be a critical tool.”9 the following 
analysis suggests that China’s arctic strategy is mildly revisionist, as it registers 
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in the middle of Johnston’s spectrum, posing both challenges and opportunities 
for cooperation with the circumpolar states. 
two recommendations are ultimately presented. first, the circumpolar states 
must be careful not to misread and in turn to overreact to China’s strategy, so as 
to avoid conflict. Illuminating the status quo and revisionist strains in China’s 
strategy will contribute to informed policy debates and help avert such miscalcu-
lation. second, because there is strong potential for cooperation with China on 
arctic development and governance, the arctic states should seek to incorporate 
China’s interests into their policy calculus. this article will draw attention to 
those interests and opportunities for cooperation. 
FUeling THe Dragon: energY inSecUriTieS
Will the twenty-first century belong to China? In strictly economic terms, the 
shift of global power to China seems inevitable. since deng Xiaoping’s 1978 
market reforms, China has sustained impressive 8–10 percent annual gross-
domestic-product growth rates and is projected by the International Monetary 
fund to overtake the United states by 2016.10 according to one scholar, by 
2030 China’s economic dominance relative to american decline will yield a 
near-unipolar world in which China is supreme.11 In many respects, the PrC is 
already economically dominant. China acts as the world’s creditor, is the world’s 
biggest export market, and is the world’s largest manufacturing nation. In light 
of its status as an economic giant despite its being a relatively “poor” nation, one 
columnist has referred to the PrC as a “premature superpower.”12
despite this rather impressive outlook, sustaining China’s economic momen-
tum poses a considerable strategic problem for the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP). because of the nation’s limited domestic-resource base, China’s breakneck 
industrialization, urbanization, and booming transportation and manufacturing 
sectors have bred massive reliance on foreign resources, particularly petroleum. 
as the world’s second-largest importer of goods and second-largest oil consumer, 
China fears that supply disruptions or shortages could derail its continued eco-
nomic momentum, thus causing social unrest and threatening the survival of 
the regime. Chinese leaders, tremendously anxious at the prospect of such an 
economic downturn, have identified oil as a component of China’s national eco-
nomic security since 2003.13 
since China became a net oil importer in 1993, PrC dependence on foreign 
energy markets has rapidly increased. oil consumption is currently estimated at 
9.9 million barrels per day, half of which is imported.14 long-term projections 
yield little consolation in this regard. according to the International energy 
agency, by 2020 China will become the world’s largest net importer of oil, with 
net imports reaching thirteen million barrels per day by 2035.15 China also suffers 
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from a rapidly increasing natural-gas import gap, and its demand is projected to 
increase by 6 percent annually through 2035.16 
Chinese security analysts and policy makers express tremendous concern 
over this “excessive” dependence on foreign energy, the vast majority of which 
relies on seaborne transportation.17 foreign reliance presents a number of stra-
tegic issues for the PrC, particularly vulnerability. for example, half of China’s 
oil originates in the politically unstable Middle east and subsequently flows 
through foreign-controlled sea lines of communication (sloCs).18 of particular 
concern is the safety of supplies transiting the strait of Malacca, which connects 
the Indian ocean and south China sea. With 85 percent of its oil imports passing 
through the narrow 1.5-mile-wide strait, China worries that its strategic lifeline 
is vulnerable to a hostile shutdown by the littoral states (Indonesia, Malaysia, and 
singapore). In response to this “Malacca dilemma,” President Hu Jintao has called 
for new strategies to alleviate the PrC’s vulnerability, reflecting deep-seated anxi-
eties within the CCP over the security of China’s energy imports.19
China also worries that many of its vessels sail through pirate-infested wa-
ters.20 In 2010 piracy attacks in the Malacca strait accounted for 15.7 percent 
of the worldwide total.21 somali pirates are also a major concern for ships sail-
ing toward the suez Canal through the gulf of aden, where as a consequence 
ship-insurance premiums have skyrocketed.22 so severe has the threat of piracy 
become that some shipping companies have begun to divert their vessels to the 
longer and more expensive route around the southern tip of africa. 
since China’s economic momentum depends significantly on long-term ac-
cess to critical resource inputs, the primary objective of China’s foreign policy 
is resource acquisition. China’s energy-import dependence, therefore, has pro-
found implications for its international behavior and is the subject of consider-
able external and internal speculation. the debate surrounding China’s resource 
strategy is framed by competing archetypes of China’s rise.23 analysts who view 
China as a status quo power argue that PrC foreign-oil dependence is a vehicle 
for greater international cooperation and integration. for those who view China 
as a revisionist state, however, oil dependence is a catalyst for conflict. 
resource diplomacy literature lends credence to the first perspective. China’s 
resource-diplomacy strategy aims to diversify its oil supply away from politi-
cally and geographically volatile regions by fostering closer ties with major oil- 
producing states around the world.24 since 1992, this strategy has enabled Chi-
nese oil companies to invest heavily in foreign oil-infrastructure projects, acquire 
equity in oil industry assets, and secure oil supply contracts with foreign firms. 
the state oil company PetroChina is noteworthy in this regard, having spear-
headed seventy-five projects in twenty-nine states around the world by 2009.25 
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Moreover, China is particularly well positioned to inject large amounts of capital 
into foreign energy markets, as it is flush with foreign-exchange reserves. China’s 
hope is that promoting economic interdependence will preclude oil suppliers 
from withholding oil exports in the event of an international crisis. 
China’s resource diplomacy also seeks to ensure the safety of its energy im-
ports by strengthening ties with governments along major sea routes. from the 
Persian gulf to the south China sea, China has secured access to commercial 
port and airfield facilities through diplomatic arrangements in order to provide 
a support network for its maritime assets in militarily distant regions. despite 
some fears in New delhi that China is encircling the Indian ocean with this 
“string of pearls” strategy, the reality appears more benign and less coordinated;26 
there is no evidence that China is establishing a system of overseas military bases. 
Instead, China’s strategy more closely resembles the creation of what american 
officials refer to as “‘places,’ as opposed to bases.”27 
In contrast, rising “energy nationalism” in China, defined by assertive govern-
mental action to obtain and protect energy supplies, has spurred the moderniza-
tion of the Chinese navy in recent years to deter rival claimants from resource-
rich regions and to provide security for the nation’s maritime supply routes.28 
this buildup gives rise to the notion that foreign-oil dependence could lead to 
conflict rather than cooperation. Underlying beijing’s naval modernization is a 
shift in Chinese strategic culture, which has become imbued by the doctrine of 
early-twentieth-century american naval strategist alfred thayer Mahan, who 
argued that the ability to protect commerce by engaging naval forces in decisive 
battle has always been a determining factor in world history.29 In 2010 rear 
admiral Zhang Huachen alluded to this strategic imperative, stating, “With the 
expansion of the country’s economic interests, the navy wants to better protect 
the country’s transportation routes and the safety of our major sea lanes.”30 
China’s new strategy represents a shift from coastal to “far sea” defense.31 
according to beijing’s 2008 defense white paper, “the Navy has been striving to 
improve in an all-round way its capabilities of integrated offshore operations, 
strategic deterrence and strategic counterattacks, and to gradually develop its 
capabilities of conducting cooperation in distant waters.”32 since 1993, the budget 
of the People’s liberation army (Pla) has increased by an average of 15 percent 
annually, with a significant portion allocated to the navy in recent years. Included 
in China’s blue-water naval buildup are antiship ballistic missiles, aircraft, under-
sea mines, optical satellites, surface ships, and a sophisticated submarine force 
that could outnumber the U.s. Navy’s within fifteen years.33 China also recently 
acquired its first aircraft carrier, an important symbol of power projection in its 
own right.34 to date, the most substantial achievement of the Pla Navy (PlaN) 
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in terms of far-sea missions has been its deployment of warships to conduct 
counterpiracy operations in the gulf of aden since late 2008. While in itself a 
limited exercise of power projection focused on the protection of commercial 
interests, this deployment is emblematic of China’s growing interest in far-sea 
operations and could portend future naval missions to protect distant interests 
more generally. 
In sum, China’s global energy strategy relies on both diplomatic and military 
components. energy insecurity has driven the PrC to diversify oil suppliers and 
modernize its navy to provide security of distant sea lines of communication 
(sloCs). as China looks north to the arctic Circle to alleviate further its energy 
needs, Chinese officials will continue to pursue this hybrid strategy, emphasiz-
ing oil diplomacy while analyzing the potential for PlaN operations to protect 
emergent arctic trade routes. 
granD STraTegY anD Foreign PolicY oBJecTiveS
analysis of Chinese grand strategy literature offers key insights into China’s 
foreign-policy goals and international behavior. during the 1990s, improvements 
in China’s military capabilities led the United states to identify China as the 
greatest modern threat to american primacy.35 In response, under Jiang Zemin’s 
leadership, China began to focus on dispelling fears of the “China threat,” charac-
terizing its rise as peaceful and representing itself as “a responsible great power.” 
successive generations of Chinese leadership have pursued this strategy in dif-
fering ways, as when China adopted the term “Peaceful development” instead of 
“Peaceful rise” in 2004.36 the central logic of China’s grand strategy has remained 
the same, however, since 1996, when Chinese leaders reached a consensus on a 
foreign-policy line. according to one analyst, China’s grand strategy is designed 
to “sustain the conditions necessary for continuing China’s program of economic 
and military modernization as well as to minimize the risk that others, most 
importantly the peerless United states, will view the ongoing increase in China’s 
capabilities as an unacceptably dangerous threat that must be parried or perhaps 
even forestalled.”37 In short, China’s grand strategy aims to facilitate its rise to 
great-power status without provoking a counterbalancing reaction. 
empirically, China’s grand strategy attends first to perceived threats to core 
interests.38 In 2004 Chinese diplomacy incorporated “core interests” into its 
lexicon and has since utilized the term assertively to pressure foreign actors to 
respect the PrC’s agenda.39 over the years, China’s official core interests have 
varied greatly, ranging from national reunification to even human rights, the 
most explicit concerns being “sovereignty and territorial integrity.”40 also, and 
for the first time, the 2011 white paper china’s Peaceful Development explicitly 
identified the nation’s political system as a core interest, along with economic and 
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social development.41 regime maintenance, economic development, and territo-
rial integrity are therefore the PrC’s top strategic priorities informing its foreign 
policy decisions. 
While officially China is committed to peaceful development in order to 
achieve great-power status and usher in an era of multipolarity, China’s actions 
with respect to preserving the integrity of its core interests seem to complicate 
that narrative.42 In particular, China has not hesitated to employ naval force to 
enforce its sweeping territorial claims in the resource-rich south China sea, 
claims that extend its borders more than a thousand miles from the mainland—
substantially farther than the two-hundred-nautical-mile limit of the United 
Nations Convention on the law of the sea (UNClos).43 examples include the 
1974 battle of the Paracel Islands, the 1988 Johnson reef skirmish, and the 2005 
scuffle with vietnamese fishing boats near Hainan Island, as well as a series of 
recent clashes over sovereignty between units of the PlaN and vessels from viet-
nam, south Korea, Japan, and the Philippines. according to Pla doctrine, “If ‘an 
enemy offends our national interests it means that the enemy has already fired 
the first shot,’ in which case the Pla’s mission is ‘to do all we can to dominate the 
enemy by striking first.’”44
Under this logic, China could resort to armed force to maintain its economic 
and political core interests. at the heart of China’s political culture is a deep inse-
curity over sustaining the nation’s rapid modernization, pointing to an intrinsic 
relationship between China’s core interests of regime maintenance and economic 
development, on one hand, and the CCP’s legitimacy, on the other, the latter rest-
ing on the party’s ability to keep unemployment low while satisfying the Chinese 
people’s demands for rising living standards.45 economic health is therefore the 
cornerstone of social stability and, subsequently, CCP legitimacy. to maintain 
social harmony and hold on to power, the CCP could utilize military force to 
secure economic interests in the event of a supply disruption or shortage. as 
demonstrated by China’s brutal suppression of the tiananmen square protests in 
the spring of 1989, the CCP will resort to any means necessary for the stability 
of its regime. 
Chinese grand-strategy literature, in short, suggests that China’s arctic strat-
egy has the potential to lead to conflict, albeit under limited circumstances. If at 
some point China’s economic momentum becomes heavily reliant on arctic re-
sources and shipping lanes, a supply disruption could lead the PrC to deploy sig-
nificant naval forces to the region to secure its interests in order to avert domestic 
social unrest. still, it will be quite some time before the arctic could become a 
key strategic theater for China’s economic interests, providing an opportunity for 
the arctic states to formulate in advance policy in response to China’s entrance 
into the High North. 
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cHina looKS norTH
China’s global resource strategy has led the PrC to the far corners of the earth, 
from venezuelan oil fields to energy-rich siberia. Now, as a consequence of accel-
erating climate change and the melting of the polar ice cap, China is increasingly 
looking to the arctic Circle for new resource-extraction and maritime-shipping 
opportunities. Current estimates as to when the arctic could be seasonally ice-
free have varied greatly from as early as summer 2013 to as late as 2040; in any 
case, the arctic is evidently thawing more rapidly than most climate models 
initially predicted.46 In august 2012, for example, the National snow and Ice 
data Center observed that arctic sea-ice extent had reached the lowest level on 
record, prompting concerns about the exponential speed at which the polar ice 
is disappearing.47 Chinese leaders are keenly aware of this trend and are making 
calculated preparations to exploit an ice-free arctic. 
since the mid-1990s, China’s extensive polar research program has spear-
headed its arctic policy. Under the direction of the Chinese arctic and antarctic 
administration (Caa), the mammoth Ukrainian-built icebreaker Xuelong has 
conducted five arctic research expeditions since 1999, reaching the geographic 
North Pole for the first time during its fourth expedition, in 2010. In 2004 the Po-
lar research Institute of China established a permanent arctic research station at 
Ny-Ålesund, in Norway’s svalbard archipelago, to monitor arctic climate change 
and its effects on China’s continental and oceanic environment.48 the Huanghe 
(yellow river) station serves as a physical indicator of both the global scope of 
China’s scientific interests and its entrance into the “polar club.”49
Impressive as is China’s polar research apparatus in its current form, beijing 
is eager to augment its operations in the arctic. China’s twelfth five-year plan 
(2011–15) reflects this ambition, announcing three new arctic expeditions to be 
conducted before 2015.50 Moreover, by 2014 China intends to launch the first of a 
series of new icebreakers to join Xuelong, thus enabling the Caa to conduct more 
frequent polar exploration and research missions.51 When the 1.25-billion-yuan 
($198 million), eight-thousand-ton vessel sets sail, China will possess icebreakers 
that are larger than and qualitatively superior to those of the United states and 
Canada.52
In addition to constructing an icebreaker fleet, the PrC is acquiring various 
technologies essential to exploiting new economic opportunities in the arctic. 
China is building ice-strengthened bulk carriers and tankers capable of com-
mercial arctic navigation, as well as planes that can fly in harsh polar weather 
conditions, in order to expand beijing’s aviation network into the arctic and as-
sist in emergency rescue missions.53 soon China may also be capable of polar oil 
extraction, as it recently acquired deepwater drilling technologies, although the 
arctic’s residual ice sheet will greatly complicate such operations.54 
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While Chinese researchers express genuine concern over arctic climate 
change (one publication stated that it is more significant than “the international 
debt crisis or the demise of the libyan dictatorship”), the PrC is apparently more 
interested in the economic implications of arctic warming than in its environ-
mental consequences.55 according to a widely circulated 2008 U.s. geological 
survey report, it is estimated that recoverable petroleum resources in the arctic 
Circle account for “13 percent of the undiscovered oil, 30 percent of the undis-
covered natural gas, and 20 percent of the undiscovered natural gas liquids in the 
world.”56 around 84 percent of these reserves are thought to reside in offshore ar-
eas. the arctic also potentially holds 9 percent of the world’s coal and significant 
deposits of diamonds, gold, and uranium. China, eager to exploit these resources, 
has grown quite vocal in its view that these are “global resources, not regional.”57
similarly enticing is the prospect of commercial shipping through the North-
ern sea route, adjacent to russia’s polar coast, and through the Northwest Pas-
sage, which transits Canadian waters. a transpolar sea route, through the center 
of the arctic ocean, could also prove a boon for shipping, yet this prospect will 
not be viable for some time, until ice-free seasons lengthen. redirecting trade 
through an arctic sea-lane could greatly alleviate PrC energy insecurities by al-
lowing commercial vessels to avoid the pirate-infested gulf of aden and south 
China sea as well as such politically volatile regions as the Middle east. this 
would contribute to the resolution of China’s “Malacca dilemma,” as that narrow 
choke point would no longer dictate global trade patterns. diverting oil supplies 
through the arctic would also reduce Chinese dependence on the strait of Hor-
muz (known in China as “the oil strait”), therefore reducing the vulnerability of 
those supplies to a hostile shutdown.58 
arctic sea-lanes could also be tremendous cost savers, as they are much shorter 
than existing routes. a voyage from rotterdam to shanghai via the Northern sea 
route, for example, is 22 percent shorter than by the current route through the 
suez Canal. Navigating the Northwest Passage would cut the suez distance by 15 
percent.59 In addition to saving time and tons of bunker fuel, carriers would also 
avoid prohibitive vessel regulations, such as size restrictions, making arctic sea-
lanes attractive for megaships that are too large to pass through current routes.60 
With these advantages in mind, President vladimir Putin of russia has touted 
the Northern sea route as an emerging rival to the suez and Panama Canals.61 
Chinese analysts share Putin’s optimism, calculating that China could save a stag-
gering $60–$120 billion per year solely by diverting trade through the Northern 
sea route.62 Ultimately, aside from the economic advantages of arctic shipping, 
additional vessels will inevitably be diverted through the arctic in any case, as 
both the suez and Panama Canals are already operating at maximum capacity.63 
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China is fully aware of this reality and is making preparations to capitalize on the 
opening of the High North to commercial shipping. 
cHina’S arcTic STraTegY
While eager to access arctic resources and shipping opportunities, China is also 
conscious of its disadvantaged status as a non-arctic state. China’s arctic strategy 
therefore privileges cooperation over confrontation so as to position the nation as 
an arctic power while preserving the arctic status quo and avoiding countermea-
sures from the circumpolar states. this strategy emphasizes soft power through 
scientific diplomacy, participation in arctic institutions, and resource diplomacy. 
the first component of China’s strategy, scientific diplomacy, promotes co-
operation with the arctic eight on arctic climate change and ecological stud-
ies. to address these issues, China will soon open its first international arctic 
cooperation and research institute in shanghai.64 further, since 1996 China has 
participated as a member of the International arctic science Committee, which 
promotes multidisciplinary research on the arctic and its impact on the world. 
Chinese scientists also consistently participate in international forums on the 
arctic environment, such as the arctic science summit Week and the Interna-
tional Polar year Programme.65 
In addition to scientific ventures, China is attempting to augment further its 
influence through participation in arctic governance. In 2007, China was admit-
ted as an ad hoc observer to the arctic Council, the most influential intergov-
ernmental organization in the region. yet to the distress of CCP leaders, China’s 
application for full observer status on the council has been denied three times 
and is unlikely to be granted in the near future. each of the council’s members has 
veto power over new accessions, and while some member countries favor China’s 
bid, there is little consensus about it in the council as a whole. Norway, for ex-
ample, has threatened to veto China’s application since 2010, when beijing halted 
political and human rights discourse with oslo in response to the awarding to 
Chinese dissident liu Xiaobo of the Nobel Peace Prize. Moreover, at the 2011 
ministerial meeting a new requirement was established that observers recognize 
the sovereignty and jurisdiction of the littoral nations over the arctic, a position 
that conflicts with China’s interests as a non-arctic state. 
despite this rather bleak outlook, China’s level of participation in arctic affairs 
is notably rising, primarily as a consequence of its resource-diplomacy strategy. 
Consistent with its global strategy in that realm, China is fostering closer ties 
with the circumpolar states and investing in resource projects in the arctic to 
diversify its supply away from politically volatile regions. arctic resources require 
enormous foreign investment to develop, and China, flush with capital, is well 
positioned to facilitate this investment and thus acquire a major stake. In turn, 
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CCP leaders hope the arctic states will be inclined to back Chinese interests in 
the region. 
since Canada exercises dominion over the Northwest Passage and will chair 
the arctic Council for two years beginning in april 2013, beijing is paying special 
attention to ottawa. China is now Canada’s second-largest trading partner and 
seventh-largest source of foreign direct investment, with investments topping 
twenty billion dollars in 2011.66 In the past two years alone, Chinese state-owned 
companies such as sinopec and the China National offshore oil Corporation 
have invested more than sixteen billion dollars in Canadian energy.67 China also 
accounts for 50 percent of the demand for Canadian minerals, demonstrating 
its capacity to become the largest trading partner and foreign investor in the 
Canadian arctic.68 despite warming sino-Canadian relations as a consequence 
of growing economic ties, however, Canada has thus far proved unwilling to sup-
port China’s accession to the arctic Council, causing the PrC to seek friends in 
other places.69 
russia has similarly attracted growing Chinese investment and trade. With its 
vast arctic coastline, russia not only controls the lion’s share of arctic resources 
within its exclusive economic zone (eeZ) but controls much of the Northern sea 
route. against this backdrop, the China National Petroleum Corporation and the 
russian sovcomflot group have signed an agreement regarding the shipment of 
hydrocarbons along the Northern sea route.70 russia has also invited China to 
engage in joint exploration and exploitation ventures for hydrocarbon deposits in 
its arctic offshore.71 In 2012 China and russia further deepened economic ties by 
signing twenty-seven trade contracts totaling fifteen billion dollars and creating a 
four-billion-dollar investment fund.72 yet even with these developments, russia, 
arguably the most important arctic player, has remained ambiguous regarding 
China’s accession to the arctic Council, having stated in July 2011 that it did not 
“in principle” oppose China’s application.73 
If the PrC has found little support for its arctic Council bid in Norway, 
Canada, and russia, it has gained support from other arctic players, particularly 
Iceland. since 2008, when reykjavík’s economy collapsed, China has injected 
substantial investment into the country, anticipating that it will soon become a 
logistics hub as the arctic warms. In april 2012 Premier Wen Jiabao traveled to 
Iceland and signed a number of bilateral deals, including a framework accord 
on North Pole cooperation. In response to these agreements, Iceland’s prime 
minister, Johanna sigurdardottir, has expressed her country’s support for China’s 
accession to the council as a permanent observer.74
denmark too has voiced support for China’s interests in the arctic. on 28 
october 2011 denmark’s ambassador to China, friis arne Petersen, stated 
that China has “natural and legitimate economic and scientific interests in the 
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arctic.”75 denmark has also declared that it “would like to see China as a per-
manent observer” at the arctic Council.76 this support coincides with Chinese 
interests in developing resources in denmark’s constituent country greenland, 
which lacks the ability to develop its resources independently. among green-
land’s substantial resource deposits are rare-earth minerals, uranium, iron ore, 
lead, zinc, gemstones, and petroleum, all magnets for Chinese investment. 
In sum, China’s strategy of scientific diplomacy, participation in arctic institu-
tions, and resource diplomacy has proved fairly successful, enabling the PrC to 
acquire peacefully a (limited) say in arctic affairs. through these measures China 
has shored up soft power in the region by successfully aligning the interests of 
some of the arctic states with its own. In addition to denmark and Iceland, 
China has garnered support for its accession to the arctic Council from sweden, 
also a member.77 even the Inuit and other indigenous peoples represented at the 
arctic Council have said that they do not object to the expansion of the council, 
as long as their own voices remain heard.78 
yet China faces a further obstacle to participation in arctic affairs, in the form 
of competition with other non-arctic states. Prominent among those countries 
vying for admission to the arctic Council as permanent observers are India, 
brazil, Japan, south Korea, the european Union, and a number of individual 
european states. the growing arctic interests of these states demonstrate that 
the race to the High North has truly become global, adding to the complexity 
of arctic geopolitics. Notably, India, already a competitor with China in south 
asia, has established a formidable arctic research program of its own, including 
a permanent research station in the svalbard archipelago and numerous research 
expeditions.79 but while the council may expand to admit a few of these states 
as observers, it is unlikely that many will gain seats, since present members are 
wary of seeing their own influence diminished.80 Moreover, China, it seems, is 
not highly favored for accession, as indicated by a January 2011 survey of public 
opinion in the eight arctic states that found that “China is the least attractive 
partner to all current arctic Council countries [save for russia].”81 these factors 
will tend to intensify Chinese relations with other non-arctic states as beijing 
fights to have a say in arctic affairs. 
cHina: PoTenTial reviSioniST arcTic Power
despite its many achievements in terms of investment and cooperation, China 
fears it is being shut out of the arctic. In 2008, for example, the “arctic five”—
Canada, russia, the United states, denmark, and Norway—signed the Ilulissat 
declaration, committing themselves to peaceful resolution of territorial sover-
eignty disputes in the arctic.82 However, with its narrow definition of arctic mat-
ters as regional ones, the declaration perceptually attempts to exclude non-arctic 
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states from them.83 China fears that in this fashion the circumpolar states will 
“gang up and ‘carve up the arctic melon’ and its natural resources among them-
selves, to the exclusion of everyone else.”84 to secure its position in arctic affairs, 
therefore, beijing propagates the notion that it has rights in the arctic, engages 
in “lawfare” to obfuscate the legal framework, advocates institutional reform, and 
cultivates hard-power measures to secure its interests. 
first and foremost, China harbors a deep sense of entitlement to arctic re-
sources, sea-lanes, and governance. this entitlement relies on various justifica-
tions. as a Northern Hemisphere country that is affected by arctic warming, a 
permanent member of the UN security Council, and the world’s most populous 
state, China sees its role in arctic affairs as indispensable. Chinese rear admiral 
yin Zhuo made this point in March 2010, proclaiming that “the arctic belongs to 
all the people around the world as no nation has sovereignty over it.”85 similarly, 
in 2009 Hu Zhengyue, China’s assistant minister of foreign affairs, warned that 
arctic countries should “ensure a balance of coastal countries’ interests and the 
common interests of the international community.”86 Hu, it seems, was advising 
the circumpolar states not to lock up for themselves the resources and sea-lanes 
of the arctic. 
China further asserts its rights by employing the language of UNClos to ar-
gue that the arctic and its resources are the “common heritage of all humankind” 
and do not belong exclusively to the arctic five.87 In reality, “common heritage” 
in UNClos refers to the high seas, designated by UNClos as the area that lies 
beyond eeZ boundaries. If the current territorial and continental-shelf claims 
of the circumpolar states are ultimately accepted as presented, 88 percent of the 
arctic seabed would likely fall under their combined sovereign eeZ jurisdic-
tions, with the small “doughnut hole” in the center qualifying as the common 
heritage.88 since, however, most of the resource wealth in the arctic lies within 
these claims, China perpetuates the notion that the entire arctic ocean is the 
common heritage of humankind so as to expand its legal rights there.89 this sort 
of “lawfare,” or misuse of the “law as a substitute for traditional military means to 
achieve an operational objective,” is an essential component of China’s strategy, 
enabling the PrC to circumvent its weaker status as a non-arctic state through 
asymmetrical means.90
China also appears bent on reforming the institutions governing the arctic so 
as to create for itself a more favorable legal environment. China’s national news 
magazine Beijing review has boldly asserted that every treaty and organization 
constituting the arctic legal regime—including UNClos, the International 
Maritime organization, and the arctic Council—is riddled with flaws and must 
be reformed. for example, in China’s view the laws enacted by the arctic Coun-
cil are not legally binding and “a politically valid . . . arctic governance system 
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has yet to be established.” Moreover, China resents the fact that arctic affairs are 
dominated by the littoral states, claiming that “it is unimaginable that non-arctic 
states will remain users of arctic shipping routes and consumers of arctic energy 
without playing a role in the decision-making process. . . . [a]n end to the arctic 
states’ monopoly of arctic affairs is now imperative.”91 
one area that China wishes to reform is free navigation through arctic sea-
lanes. according to UNClos, while foreign vessels are granted the right of “in-
nocent passage” through territorial waters and free navigation through exclusive 
economic zones, states retain full sovereignty over internal waters—waters on 
the landward side of the baseline from which the territorial zone is demarcated—
and can restrict shipping therein. Under this provision, russia has declared that 
currently accessible portions of the Northern sea route fall within its internal 
waters;92 for its part, Canada has asserted that the Northwest Passage constitutes 
“historic internal waters.”93 In response, some Chinese scholars and government 
officials have suggested that the svalbard treaty—the instrument that governs 
the international use of Norway’s svalbard archipelago, where China maintains 
its sole arctic research station—could be used as a model for resolving Canada’s 
claims of sovereignty over the Northwest Passage.94 Under such an agreement, 
Canada would retain full sovereignty over the passage but with the provision 
that international shipping would be allowed free navigation rights. However, 
Canada, like russia, places an extremely high premium on its arctic sovereignty 
and is unlikely to favor such a proposal.95
In light of these disadvantages, some speculation has arisen as to whether 
China, which has an extensive history of advocating its own sovereignty rights 
while disregarding the claims of other states, will respect the sovereign claims of 
the circumpolar states or instead utilize military force to secure its interests. In 
fact, a Chinese military presence in the arctic is not beyond the realm of possibil-
ity, and the idea is entertained with some seriousness in the PrC. for example, li 
Zhenfu of dalian Maritime University has written that the arctic “has significant 
military value, a fact recognized by other countries.” similarly, the Pla, which 
has apparently assumed the role of guardian of China’s core national interests, has 
adopted a strident tone on arctic affairs. In 2008, for example, senior Colonel 
Han Xudong warned that the “possibility of use of force cannot be ruled out in 
the arctic due to complex sovereignty disputes.”96 In contrast, Chinese political 
officials have expressed a preference for cooperative resolution of arctic disputes. 
this disjunction between Chinese military and political commentary hints at 
internal divisions over arctic strategy and raises questions whether the Pla is 
driving China’s economic and strategic fixation with the arctic. to the extent that 
in fact it is, Pla posturing could translate into action. 
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With its naval modernization program now aimed at “far-sea defense,” a Chi-
nese military presence in the arctic could materialize as beijing becomes more 
reliant on arctic resources and sea-lanes to fuel its economy. China could deploy 
submarines or surface warships into the arctic to conduct surveillance, defend 
economic interests, or accomplish strategic goals. In recent years the PlaN has 
grown increasingly assertive, as in 2009, when five Chinese vessels stalked UsNs 
impeccable, ostensibly defending China’s territorial claims in the south China 
sea.97 david Curtis Wright has argued that given this trend, along with “the 
brazen nuclear-powered submarine violation of Japanese territorial waters on 10 
November 2004, the lurking of one or more Chinese submarines in the arctic 
should not come as much of a surprise, if it has not happened already.”98 In fact, 
Xuelong’s oceanographic studies and sea-bottom research during its 1999 expedi-
tion had “operational implications for the PlaN’s antisubmarine warfare (asW) 
capability,” suggesting that China could already be making preparations for a 
military contingency in the High North.99 In addition to these considerations, 
China might also find an arctic naval presence attractive as it would constitute a 
strategic vantage point from which to exert pressure on the United states in the 
event of a confrontation over, for example, taiwan. 
at a minimum, when climate change makes the sea routes and resources of the 
arctic truly profitable, China may seek to establish a naval presence along the be-
ring strait to provide trade security. No more than fifty-two nautical miles wide, 
the bering strait, which separates alaska and russia, was referred to as the “Ice 
Curtain” during the Cold War and is now sometimes called the “bering gate.”100 
as China’s only entry point into the arctic, the bering strait is a narrow choke 
point through which all of the nation’s energy and trade transiting the arctic will 
have to pass. the PlaN, therefore, will be deeply concerned with its safety. 
cHanging THe rUleS 
China’s entrance into the arctic signals the reality that arctic affairs may no 
longer be considered strictly regional, as climate change makes the arctic’s vast 
resource wealth and shipping lanes accessible to the world. When formulating 
arctic policy, therefore, circumpolar actors must take into account the intentions 
of non-arctic states. the foregoing analysis is relevant to that decision calculus, 
as it illuminates the status quo and revisionist strains in China’s arctic strategy. 
It appears that China’s arctic strategy qualifies under the third level of alastair 
Iain Johnston’s framework referred to above, which holds that a non–status quo 
actor may participate in the institutions of an international community and 
temporarily adhere to its rules and norms yet, if given the opportunity, attempt 
to “change these rules and norms in ways that defeat the original purposes of the 
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institution and the community.” While China’s strategy stresses cooperation and 
participation in existing arctic institutions, such as the arctic Council, it also 
challenges the rules and norms protecting the exclusive rights of the circumpolar 
states. for example, China’s claim that arctic resources are global contradicts the 
norm and legal principle that arctic affairs are regional affairs. still, beyond mili-
tary and strategic circles, China has displayed no intention of realizing a “radical 
redistribution” of material power in the arctic through military means. since 
China’s strategy favors institutional and normative reform over military conflict, 
China must be considered a mildly revisionist arctic power. 
Nevertheless, the potential for conflict exists, and its likelihood will depend to 
a significant degree on how the circumpolar states react to China’s arctic ambi-
tions. China’s strategy emphasizes the status quo only so long as that proves con-
ducive to its “core interests”; beijing could pursue more revisionist policies if it 
perceived these interests as severely threatened. If at some point the CCP were to 
determine that supply disruptions or a blockade of commercial vessels threatened 
its economic interests in the arctic to the point of impacting Chinese social, and 
subsequently regime, stability, it could respond with military force. to reduce the 
likelihood of such a conflict, the arctic eight should incorporate PrC interests 
into their arctic policy calculus, in two basic ways. 
first, the circumpolar states must be cautious not to overreact to a Chinese 
presence in the arctic. this is not to say that they should avoid precautionary 
measures; prudence dictates that the arctic eight prepare for military contin-
gencies and protect their northern sovereignty should, for instance, the strategic 
value of the arctic region eventually attract Chinese warships for protecting trade 
or exerting pressure on the United states. still, the logic of the security dilemma 
suggests that heavy arctic militarization or inflammatory rhetoric could pro-
voke conflict if regional states, worried about China’s growing influence, were to 
engage in excessive military posturing and thereby intensify China’s concerns. 
second, the arctic eight should seek to include, rather than exclude, China 
in arctic institutions and agreements, which they can do without ceding their 
own rights. admission of the PrC as a permanent observer country to the arctic 
Council, for example, would go far toward meeting Chinese interests. a number 
of non-arctic countries (all of them european) already operate as permanent ob-
servers to the council, and the expansion of such a right to an east asian country 
would enhance the organization’s soft power in that region. More importantly, 
admission of China to the arctic Council as a permanent observer would not sig-
nificantly diminish the influence of the arctic eight, as, among other limitations, 
observers do not have voting privileges. given this point, along with the fact that 
Chinese and american interests are aligned on such issues as free navigation 
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through the Northwest Passage, Washington would be well served to advocate 
China’s accession to the council. 
China’s arctic strategy remains in its formative stages. yet even if a Chinese 
threat to arctic security never materializes, the unfolding race to the north will 
tend to intensify sino-arctic strategic suspicion, as well as tension between China 
and other non-arctic states seeking a say in arctic affairs. to avoid a destabiliz-
ing escalation, it will be important not only for the littoral states to be inclusive 
of China but also for the PrC to improve the transparency of its arctic policy 
making by clarifying its intentions in the High North. 
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